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This research was designed to discover correlative effects of US GDP with prison 
population. This arose out of the lack of studies conducted on economic effects of prison 
laborers within the U.S. economic framework. A rudimentary statistical regression was 
executed to determine the effects of real GDP based in the year 2012 with the U.S. prison 
population. Qualitative and theoretical sources supplemented the analysis to provide 
context to the trends that were discovered. Change in U.S. GDP was found to have 
ambiguous effects on the prison population which debunks the notion that recessions cause 




Prisons were introduced to the United States (U.S.) legal system in the19th century 
as a means to deviate from more severe forms of punishment commonly used by their 
former colonial counterparts. Broadly, there was not a ponderous use of a penal system 
within US society until the late 1970s (Alexander, 2020). The use of the penal system 
arose from political measures stemming from the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. It 
was in this era that the, “war on drugs,” was initiated. Several directives arrived in this 
period of declining incarceration and crime rates that would have long lasting effects on 
the U.S. penal system. Some have theorized that the contradictory measures of criminal 
regulation were a means towards political expediency and gain, while others have 
hypothesized that the true reason for the stark uptick in carceral actions was one derived 
in economic gain for low lost labor through the penal welfare system. Flounders (2011) 
asserted that, “private prisons…are a greater source of profit [than military spending] and 
are reinforced by the climate of racism and reaction.” This hypothesis has yet to be 
founded in terms of quantitative economic analysis. This paper aims to see the reverse 
causality. Does US economic activity have any role in prison population? This leads us to 
generate more substantiation towards answering the higher level societal question: 
Should the U.S. keep prisons? 
From a sociological lens prison are unethical and detrimental to the well-being of 
incarcerated persons, particularly if levels of crime are not severe or if criminal activities 
are not repeated. When created, prisons were originally intended as a temporary means to 
reduce the severity in criminal punishment and were even projected to certainly cause 
severe mental health issues by the likes of Charles Dickens (Davis, 2011). They continue 
to subject those punished to forms of abuse and what some may consider mental torture. 
Some would argue that their effects of rehabilitation have decreased crime rates in high 
populated areas; however, the National Research Council concluded that while prison 
growth was a factor in reducing crime, “the magnitude of the crime reduction remains 
highly uncertain and the evidence suggests it was unlikely to have been large,” (Criminal 
Justice Facts, 2021). This common misconception has led to the bi-lateral agreement of 
politicians and voters to cosign the legislation that increases the number of incarcerated 
citizens within the united states (Alexander, 2020). This action and consensus perpetuates 
sociological issues that damage the framework of interactions among U.S. citizens. 
Despite these prevailing issues the penal system seems to thrive in this country with the 
U.S. having 639 per 100,000 citizens incarcerated, the largest incarceration rate in the 
world (Statista). It is only logical to further examine the penal system’s utility form an 
economic lens to discern if there is an overall benefit towards incarceration to the U.S. 
societal framework. 
 
Prisons have been deemed lucrative by leading economists since the late 1990s. 
There have been so many benefits from convict labor that it has been recommended that 
 
 
there be an increase in carceral means to rehabilitate prisoners and utilize this practice as 
means to bolster economic production (Flanagan, 1993). The overarching effect prisons 
have on the U.S. economy arrive from their ability to produce goods at extraordinarily 
low wages. It must be recognized that prisons currently generate millions in revenue via 
Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) organizations every year (Bair 2007). This amount of 
revenue is correlated with the amount of prison commodities produced by federal, state, 
and private prisons. That amount of production is correlated to the amount of inmates 
held within all three entities at a given time. Thus, there may be correlative effects of 
U.S. prison population numbers to the changes in the US GDP. This paper is aimed 
towards analyzing data to determine if there are any such correlations. 
 
 
 Literature Review 
By constructing data trends in changes in prison population statistics over time, 
there can be a determination of effective measures on economic activity as it relates to 
the amount of potential candidates for low cost prison labor. The following doctrine 
analyzes a high level correlation of gross domestic product (GDP) to the change in prison 
population over a span of forty years starting in the year 1980. This will give those who 
may be interested in justifying—or negating—the use of prison labor in the U.S. 
economy a clearer perspective of potential economic effects. The hypothesis based on 
previous research done by Bair (2007) and Douglas et al. (2018) is that the US GDP and 
the change in the U.S. prison population could have a direct correlation. 
 
Douglas et al. (2018) posit that prison labor has contributed to the national 
economy since the New Deal era. While the privatized sector of the economy boomed 
due to the industrial age and the country’s economic stability moved from less of a state-
controlled economy, government labor expanded more in the direction of the Prison 
Industrial complex (PIC). The PIC expansion that has so occurred is so intertwined with 
the overall economy that Douglas et al. (2018) hypothesize that it is nearly impossible to 
determine the effects of prison industrial labor (within the U.S. economy). However, 
literature of prison labor income and prison commodity production has been produced, 
which may lead to more information on what effects inmate labor has on the overall 
economy.  
 
Prisoners are considered to have an income through federal welfare (Bair, 2007). 
This income can be reduced below normal based on an inmate’s condition (i.e. if they are 
segregated from the prison population due to solitary confinement). A prisoner’s income 
can be re-defined as welfare plus master provision. The master provision is the value of 
the labor that the prison-warden allots each inmate. A subsumed class revenue can be 
received by prisoners who are subject to the, “SFCP (slave fundamental class process),” 
within a production process involving a state entity. There is an increase in demand for 
products and services that were once provided by prison welfare. The increase in demand 
has caused a higher amount of government spending on the PIC. This in turn forces more 
inmates to seeking labor while serving their sentences, boosting the prison economy. The 
warden can then distribute welfare funds based on the grant received from the state and 
can manipulate the value of the prison wages based on contribution to final value of 
products produced to maximize profit. 
 
Bair also explains that if the price difference of a prison commodity and the 
commodity’s market value is less than the difference of the welfare provided commission 
for prison labor and the labor value asserted by the warden of the prison, then the cost of 
production justifies the continuation for prison labor production of that commodity. If the 
 
 
price of the prison produced commodity is raised, the warden of either a state or federal 
prions can make a profit without having to manipulate the value of the inmate labor. 
From these findings, it can be assumed that that the state and federal prison system 
benefits substantially from obtaining low cost prison labor. 
 
Prior to The 1980s states used laws and other restrictive legislation to limit the 
market for prison goods, thereby limiting the appeal of the corrections arena for private 
investors. The Percy Amendment in 1979 is what allowed conditions for interstate 
commerce, recommended inmate wage deductions of 80%, and decreed that inmates 
could not be denied workers compensation. Percy Act later became the Prison Industry 
Enhancement (PIE) Act. Private sectors have historically taken two roles in the PIE 
process: employing inmates by hiring or firing prison workers as an operator near the 
prison or purchasing a sizable portion of the goods generated by the prison industry 
(Flanagan 1993). If a PIE agency of a particular state is selling a commodity, then (even 
in cases of being a non-profit entity) there can be a labor surplus produced from the 
exchange of the prison produced good. On average the federal and state deductions made 
by PIE entities are about 54%. In California the sole PIE authority is the Prison Industry 
Authority (PIA) which typically pays inmates whose production is not involved with 
private enterprise commodities $0.30-$0.95 per hour. Wages are then typically reduced 
by, “court ordered restitution and fines, payments to cover room and board, and other 
fees which jurisdictions may impose (Bair 2007).”  The appropriation of welfare which 
causes low prison wages and profit for wardens then leads to the ability for PIE agencies 
to generate higher revenue. This amount of benefit from surplus labor and state welfare is 
based on the amount of prisoners within a given system and the value of the commodity. 
 
It must be noted that incarcerated people commonly do not have the choice to 
work, and there are several prisons where the number of jobs is not proportional to 
population. Therefore, what we consider to be wages can be classified as nothing more 
than provisions provided to incarcerated persons. This distinction is made because based 
on the Marxian theory, wages are deemed to be chosen in a capitalistic framework by an 
individual. Individual laborers are also considered to have the choice to sell their labor 
power.  Inmates in a US prison do not have this option. They can be assigned work based 
on behavior and do not always get to decide what work they are given (commodity 
production versus housekeeping roles). 
 
Despite what may seem to be an overarching ethical dilemma that involvement of 
private sector entities provides, Kling et al. (2001) made a prescription to the U.S. 
government to increase close cooperation between the private sector and the prison 
industry. It may be noted that the inability of the laborers to choose their role, could have 
an adverse economic effect due to a lack of specialization. Prisoners not having an ability 
 
 
to select the work they do can put many laborers in positions not fit for optimal 
production. This may cause an inefficiency in goods produced and actually run many 
prisons at a loss for commodities produced in relation to labor potential. Furthermore, 
providing prisoners with mere provisions could also have detrimental effects on 
production quantity and quality. In addition, reducing the amount of compensation below 
a wage that provides prison laborers with the ability to utilize their earnings for amenities 
possibly dissuades laborers from generating optimal production based on. The number of 
welfare-based amenities inmates receive might determine whether a prisoner has a labor 
surplus. This is dictated by whether they are segregated by the population due to 
infractions. Following the manipulation of funds, the welfare that prisoners are to receive 
typically go towards commodities for prisoners and prison expenditures (Bair, 2007). 
Flanagan et al. (1993) discusses how prisons can contribute to the improvement of 
economic productivity in a non-threatening way to. This study describes several models 
of full employment of the U.S. prison population as well as providing some projections of 
the economic impact of prisoner full employment. Flanagan et al. (1993) find that by 
increasing prison labor rates the PIC would be more lucrative over time and the money 
could be utilized for other industrial complexes. The effects of wage/amenity differences 
on commodity production is a topic that could be dissected in future research studies. 
 
Another beneficial topic to inspect would be the PIE agencies for all 50 states 
within the U.S. Analyzing the benefit of revenue from the welfare and labor surplus 
produced by each state could lead to determining the significance of prison labor on the 
larger economic scale. Scott et al. (2006) examine whether the prison economy displaces 
state industries. As of 2004, the Ohio Prison industry (OPI) generated $31.6 million in 
sales revenue. Of this the multiplier effect caused $ 10 million to be distributed as 
employee wages and $ 1.5 million as prisoner wages. Such a phenomenon, does impact 
the local economy. The amount of revenue generated could be compared to the amount of 
investments and government spending that contribute to GDP to grasp a thorough 
perspective of the broader economic effects of prison labor. Finally, a similar analysis 
could be conducted for every state to denote the impact of prion labor on state economies. 
Our study contributes to this literature by finding if the level of economic activity 




The basic statistical regression model studied in this study understands a 
relationship between number of prisoners, time of study and level of economic activity as 
measured by gross domestic product.1 
 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑡𝑌𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡: 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 ′𝑡′  ∀ 𝑖 = 1 … 3 
 




𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
prisoners with govt considered
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
 
𝑌𝑡: 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ′𝑡′ 
 
Where t is the time period (or year minus the year before the first year in the dataset) 
a,b,c are the coefficients that determine the relationship of number of prisoners with other 




     Time series data were acquired from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Bureau of 
Justice statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The number of prisoners are classified into three major subcategories: federal, state, and 
private. Federal and state prisoners are those housed in institutions owned by the federal 
and state government. They are operated and run by federal employees and are typically 
funded by tax dollars (welfare as aforementioned) allotted by the Federal government. 
Private prisons are owned, developed, and operated by for-profit corporations that have 
contracts with the government. The prison population is then correlated with GDP of 
each corresponding year using a statistical regression methodology. 
 
We use regression analysis on the entire prison population as well as 
subcategories of federal, state and private populations.  
At more detailed level further analysis in relation to specific welfare distributions, 
government spending, and PIE organization revenue over time must be acquired and 
analyzed. 
                                                 
1 We did not consider either US population or GDP per capita as they are assumed to be correlated with the 




Results of the regression models are presented in tables 1 through 4. Prison 
population was positively correlated with the level of economic activity until the year 
2009, when the new law was implemented (Model 1). Post that, even as the economy 
continued to expand prison population started shrinking (Model 2). These relationships 
were valid even accounting for time trend which seemed to have a positive effect on 
prison population (Models 3 and 4). When broken down by government prisoners in 
Models 5, 6, 7 and 8, these relations are maintained (the only exception being in Model 7, 
when introduction of time trend causes a negative correlation between GDP and number 
of government prisoners). However, this relation was not statistically significant. Because 
of this, further investigation was initiated and the dependent variable was drilled down to 
state prisons and federal prisons. The relationship was maintained in the case of federal 
prisons (Models 9, 10, 11 and 12) and most models of state prisons (Models 13, 14 and 
16). However, it was the state prisons in Model 15 that the correlation between GDP and 
number of prisoners was negative and significant at 5% that caused the overall 
relationship to be not significant at 10% in Model 7. 
 
Additionally, we studied the correlations between private prisoner numbers and 
GDP and time trend. This time we did not find any correlation of prisoner numbers with 
time. However, the positive pre-2009 correlation with GDP and negative post-2009 
correlation was maintained. These correlations were robust across federal and state 
prisoner models as well as inclusion of time trend. (Models 17-28) 
 
Subsequently we discussed the effect of prison population on change in GDP to evaluate 
whether it was recessions that were affecting prison population levels. We found that 
change in GDP had ambiguous effect on the prison population from year to year. 
 





Fig 1.  Net annual change in prison population starting in 1980. 
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Fig 3. Prison population levels since 1998. 
 




















































From the tables above, it seems that the level of economic activity as seen from 
real GDP was an indicator of higher incarceration until 2009 and 2010. This is a result of 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which reduced the sentencing time of prisoners who 
were formerly convicted under statutes of the Controlled Substances Act (Library of 
Congress, 2010). The 2010 Act eliminated the mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years 
for first time-possession of crack cocaine offenders. It can also be seen that in the year 
2019 there was a severe drop in the net amount of prisoners due to the novel COVID-19 
virus outbreak. This pandemic reduced the amount of prisoners being sentenced as a 
means to mitigate the spread of viral infection among inmates. Many aspects of the 
economy were impacted by the virus, thus the drop in net prison sentencing cannot justify 
the decrease in economic performance for that year as it relates to GDP.  
 
When accounting for the structural break in the net change of prison population 
post the year 2009 political and legislative causations were considered. This period marks 
the first time since 1970 that there had been 3 consecutive years of net prison population 
decline This was an outcome of political-economic happenings. There seemed to be a 
bigger political push to reduce the nation’s reliance on prisons. The reduction could also 
be attributed towards the recession of that time period. State budgets for prisons were 
being reallocated and used towards alternative punishment methods that were more 
effective and to cost reductive (Goode, 2013). 
 
From a legislative perspective there were motivators for the decreasing net change 
in prison population: 
 
“In August 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act was signed into law, which changed 
(reduced) the amount of prison time a person would receive for convictions 
involving crack cocaine.  The sentencing guidelines developed for that legislation 
were made retroactive so that inmates who were already in the system could see a 
reduction in their prison terms.” (Pavlo, 2014) 
 
However, the decree only reduced sentences for a very few number of prisoners that 
applied (percentages in the range of 5%-15%). The steady decrease seen on the 
population seems to have been an offspring from the number of prisoners that qualified 
for early release. We found that change in GDP had ambiguous effect on the prison 
population indicating that there may be a falsehood in the common ideology of recessions 
increasing dire criminal offenses (i.e. murder, assault, and other crimes which warrant 
prison sentencing. 
 
While we have correlative effects at play the dominating factor to cause the correlation 
still remains a mystery. It could be assumed in further research that it is the decrease in 
low cost labor through inmate population that drives the economy into recession. An 
analysis of PIE organization revenue by each state over the past 20 years may provide an 
indicator towards the effects of prison revenue. Currently the correlation asserts that—
 
 
like all other industries in the U.S. economic system—a downturn in GDP causes 
negative effects of employment within the prison system.  
 
Conclusion 
The reliance on prisons as a form of correctional action has been on a stark rise within the 
U.S. since the 1970s. The resulting increase in prison population has raised ethical 
concerns over whether the US GDP may have a correlation with low cost prison labor 
that generates revenue for PIE organizations. Many misconceptions and claims have been 
made in justifying and rejecting the continual use of prison labor within the U.S. 
economic framework.  From the analysis conducted the change in GDP appears to have 
ambiguous effect on the prison population debunking the common conception that 
recessions tend to increase serious criminal activity. This is critical realization in molding 
future economic policy as it relates to the Bureau of Justice. Further research may be 
conducted on the revenue generated by prisoners over time to respective PIE 
organizations to determine the level of significance the prison industrial labor force has 
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Table 1:  Results from regression models of factors determining prison population including GDP and time trend 
  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Period 
(first year / 
last year) (1/29)  (30/ 40) (1/29) (30/40)  (1/29)  (30/40) (1/29) (30/40) 
Dependent 
variable PP PP PP PP GovPP GovPP GovPP GovPP 
Constant 









  53533 81664 99098 178521 68908 67258 174270.6 147968 
  0.006 0 0.002 0 0 0 0.019 0 
          
Yt 
110.57 ***     -66.15*** 47.51**  -182.8***  170.05***  -62.017***  -34.271 
 -
157.487*** 
  3.79 4.83 19.81 41.91 6.216 3.9747 30.31 34.737 
  0.00 0 0.048 0.002 0 0 0.269 0.002 
         
T    24209.15 42903**     69432*** 35102** 
     7538.92 15351     10219 12724 
     0.15 0.023     0 0.025 
         
Δ𝑌𝑡                
                 
                 
         
R^2 0.99 0.9543 0.9962 0.9769 0.9652 0.9463 0.9875 0.9817 
F-stat 853*** 188 928 169 749 243 1023 215 
n  10  11 10  11 29  11  29  11  
 
 
Table 2: Results from regression models of factors determining prison population from state and federal prisons including GDP and time trend. 
 
  
 M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 
Period (first 
year / last year)  (1/29)  (30/40) (1/29) (30/40) (1/29)  (30/40) (1/29) (30/40) 
Dependent 
variable GovfedPP Govfedpp Govfedpp GovfedPP GovstPP GovstPP GovstPP GovstPP 
Constant -1119335  391121***  -109096***  558768***  -5939541***  2400243*** 544770  2615724*** 
  4053.3 37409 16952 96065 67807 3649 169274.7 77391.2 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.003 0 
          
Yt  20.67***  -11.152***  18.857***  -52.927**  149.37***  -50.86***  -53.1295*  -104.56*** 
  0.36564 2.211 2.948 22.55 6.117 2.157 29.44 18.168 
  0 0.001 0 0.047 0 0 0.083 0 
         
T     618.734 15360     68813*** 19742** 
      994.03 8261     9925.6 6655 
      0.539 0.1     0 0.018 
         
Δ𝑌𝑡                 
                  
                  
         
R^2 0.9916 0.7387 0.9918 0.8176 0.9567 0.9841 0.9848 0.9924 
F-stat 3198 25.4 1563 17.93 596 556 842 524 
n   29 11  29  11  29  11   29 11 
 
 
Table 3: Results from regression models of factors determining prison population of private prisons, federal private prisons including GDP and time trend. 
  
 M17 M18 M19 M20 M21 M22 M23 M24 
Period (first 
year / last year)  (1/29)  (30/40) (1/29)  (30/40)  (1/29)  (30/40) (1/29) (30/40) 
Dependent 
variable Pvpp Pvpp pvpp Pvpp Pfedpp Pfedpp pfedpp  pfedpp  
Constant  -121886***  197161***  -157609**  282298***  -91394***  83303***  -107400***  168722*** 
  23120 19065 65723 49032 9192 17873 25956 44516 
  0 0 0.048 0 0 0.001 0.004 0.005 
          
Yt  15.687***  -4.137***  23.3  -25.352*  7.9089***  -2.889**  11.319*  -24.174** 
  1.635 1.1267 13.136 11.511 0.65 1.056 5.187 10.45 
  0.001 0.005 0.119 0.059 0 0.023 0.065 0.049 
         
T     -2921.68 7800     -1309 7826* 
      5000 4216     1975 3828 
      0.577 0.101     0.529 0.075 
         
Δ𝑌𝑡                 
                  
                  
         
R^2 0.92 0.5997 0.9238 0.7196 0.9487 0.4539 0.9518 0.6413 
F-stat 92.06 13.48 42.41 10.27 148 7.48 69 7.15 
n  10 11 10  11   10  11  10 11  
 
 
Table 4:: Results from regression models of factors determining prison population from state private prisons including GDP and time trend. 
 
 M25 M26 M27 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 
Period (first 



















Constant  -30493*  113859***  -50208*  113575***     
  16462 7933 47251 24378     
  0.101 0 0.323 0.002     
           
Yt  7.778***  -1.248**  11.979*  -1.178*     
  1.164 0.4688 9.444 5.723     
  0 0.026 0.245 0.842     
          
T     -1613 -25.92     
      3595 2096.3     
      0.667 0.99     
          
Δ𝑌𝑡      -205.26  -132.23  10.459  44.926 
      254.7 82.52 24.135 30.744 
      0.44 0.144 0.678 0.182 
         
R^2 0.848 0.4406 0.8523 0.4406     
F-stat 44.64 7.09 20.19 3.15     
n   10 11  10  11 10 11 10 11 
